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Abstract. This paper addresses the problem of verifying and correcting
programs when they are moved from a sequential consistency execution
environment to a relaxed memory context. Specifically, it considers the
TSO (Total Store Order) relaxation, which corresponds to the use of
store buffers, and its extension x86-TSO, which in addition allows syn-
chronization and lock operations.
The proposed approach uses a previously developed verification tool that
uses finite automata to symbolically represent the possible contents of the
store buffers. Its starting point is a program that is correct for the usual
sequential consistency memory model, but that might be incorrect under
x86-TSO. This program is then analyzed for this relaxed memory model
and when errors are found (with respect to safety properties), memory
fences are inserted in order to avoid these errors. The approach proceeds
iteratively and heuristically, inserting memory fences until correctness is
obtained, which is guaranteed to happen.
An advantage of our technique is that the underlying symbolic verifi-
cation tool makes a full exploration possible even for cyclic programs,
which makes our approach broadly applicable. The method has been
tested with an experimental implementation and can effectively handle
a series of classical examples.
1 Introduction
Model-checking tools such as SPIN [1] verify concurrent programs under the
traditional Sequential Consistency (SC) memory model [2], in which all accesses
to the shared memory are immediately visible globally. However, modern multi-
processor architectures implement relaxed memory models, such as Total Store
Order (TSO) [3, 4], which allow many more possible executions and thus can
introduce errors that were not present in SC. Of course, one can force a pro-
gram executed in the context of TSO to behave exactly as in SC by adding
synchronization operations after every memory access. But this totally defeats
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the performance advantage that is precisely the motivation for implementing
relaxed memory models, rather than SC. Thus, when moving a program to an
architecture implementing a relaxed memory model (which includes most cur-
rent multi-core processors), it is essential to have tools to help the programmer
check if correctness is preserved and, if not, to minimally introduce the necessary
synchronization operations.
Processor vendors do not publish formal definitions of the memory models
their products implement, but rather document the memory model by describing
sets of typical behaviors. This is not sufficient for building verification tools,
but the problem has been well studied and quite simple models that cover the
behaviors that can be seen in actual processors have been defined. These models
can be axiomatic, giving constraints that characterize the possible behaviors, or
operational, giving a program like description of the relaxed memory system.
The model we will use is TSO [3, 4], and its extension x86-TSO [5], which covers
the possible behaviors of many current processors. In x86-TSO, just as in TSO,
writes are buffered, and each processor can read its last buffered values before
these become globally visible. In addition, x86-TSO includes a memory barrier
instruction (memory fence) that can be used for synchronization, as well as a
global lock allowing atomic operations on the shared memory. The operational
model of x86-TSO is quite natural: each process writes to its own buffer from
which it can also read, writes being nondeterministically committed to main
memory.
Based on these models, several verification approaches and tools for concur-
rent programs executed under relaxed memory models have been developed. In
[6], we proposed a technique that incorporates the TSO store buffers into the
model and uses finite automata to represent the possibly infinite set of possible
contents of these buffers. This representation coupled with acceleration tech-
niques similar to those proposed in [7], as well as with the sleep-sets partial-order
reduction techniques [8], allows a full exploration of the state space of programs,
including cyclic programs. Other work on this topic includes [9], which proceeds
by detecting behaviors that are not allowed by SC but might occur under TSO
(or PSO (Partial Store Order) [4]). This is done by only exploring SC interleav-
ings of the program, and by using explicit store buffers. The more theoretical
work presented in [10] uses results about systems with lossy fifo channels to
prove the decidability of reachability under TSO with respect to unbounded
store buffers, but the undecidability of repeated reachability. Other approaches
to verification, with respect to relaxed memory models, adopt the axiomatic
definition of these models and exploit SAT-based bounded model checking [11,
12], which of course pushes handling cyclic programs or unbounded buffers be-
yond their reach. Finally, [13] proposes an approach based on SPIN that uses
a Promela model with (bounded) explicit queues and an explicit representation
of the dependencies on memory accesses that are implied by the relaxed model
RMO (Relaxed Memory Order) [4].
This paper focuses on porting a program, verified under SC to x86-TSO,
while preserving its safety properties. The approach is based on the verifica-
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tion tool presented in [6], which makes it applicable to cyclic programs. A first
contribution is to show that the performance of this tool can be improved by a
more complete use of partial-order techniques. The improvement is such that the
number of states explored while verifying under the relaxed memory model is
often not significantly larger than the number of states explored in a verification
under SC.
The second contribution of the paper is the method developed for safely
porting programs from SC to x86-TSO. It starts by attempting to verify the
program under x86-TSO and, if an undesirable state is found to be reachable,
memory fences are inserted. The insertion policy is based on the observation
that if no process can execute a load after a store without going through an
mfence (memory fence), then every safety (unreachability of undesirable states)
property satisfied under SC is also satisfied under x86-TSO. Exploiting this, we
develop a heuristic iterative approach, which is guaranteed to converge.
2 Concurrent Programs and Memory Models
We consider a very simple model of concurrent programs in which a fixed set of
finite-state processes are interacting through a shared memory. Such a concurrent
system is thus defined by a finite set of processes P = {p1, . . . , pn} and a finite
set of memory locations M = {m1, . . . ,mk}, the initial content of the shared
memory being defined by a function I :M→D, D being the domain of memory
values.
The definition of each process pi includes a finite set of control locations
L(pi), an initial control location `0(pi) ∈ L(pi) and a set of transitions labeled by
operations taken from a set O. The transitions of a process pi are thus elements
of L(pi)×O × L(pi), also written as ` op→ `′, where both `, `′ ∈ L(pi).
The set O of operations contains the two following memory operations:
– store(pi,mj , v), the meaning of which is that process pi stores the value
v ∈ D to the memory location mj ,
– load(pi,mj , v), the meaning of which is that process pi loads the value stored
in memory location mj and checks if that value is equal to v. The operation
is possible only if the values are equal, otherwise it does not go through and
execution is blocked.
Under the SC memory model, the semantics of such a concurrent program is
the one in which the possible behaviors are all the interleavings of the operations
executed by the different processes, and in which the store operations become
immediately visible to all processes.
In TSO, each process executing a store operation can directly load the value
saved by this store operation, but other processes cannot always immediately
see that value and might read an older value stored in shared memory. This
can lead to executions that are not possible on a sequential consistency memory
system. For example, in the program given in Table 1, both processes can run
through and finish their execution if run on a TSO memory system, but this
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cannot happen on an SC memory system, where at least one process would find
the value 1 in its last load operation, which would thus not go through.
Table 1. Intra-processor forwarding example from [14]
initially:
x = y = 0;
Process 1 Process 2
store(p1, x, 1) (s1) store(p2, y, 1) (s2)
load(p1, x, 1) (l1) load(p2, y, 1) (l3)
load(p1, y, 0) (l2) load(p2, x, 0) (l4)
The x86-TSO memory model [15, 5] is an extension of TSO in which oper-
ations such as atomic writes and flushing (emptying) the buffer content to the
shared memory, have been added. In spite of its name, x86-TSO is not an ex-
act model of a given architecture, but is an abstract programmer’s model that
covers the documented behaviors of a wide range of processors. One can thus
safely assume that a program verified under x86-TSO will run correctly on the
corresponding processors.
The formal definitions of the memory models use the concepts of program
order and memory order [3, 16]. Program order (<p) is a partial order in which
the instructions of each process are ordered as executed, but instructions of dif-
ferent processes are not ordered with respect to each other. Memory order (<m)
is a total order on the memory operations, which is fictitious but characterizes
what happens during relaxed executions.
Let op denote any load or store operation, l any load operation, s any store
operation, la a load operation on location a, and sa a store operation on location
a. Furthermore, let val(l) be the value returned by the load operation l and let
val(s) be the value stored by the store operation s.
An SC execution is one for which there exists a memory order satisfying the
following constraint for each process pi:
1. ∀opi, opj : opi <p opj ⇒ opi <m opj
This means that the memory order is an interleaving of the program orders. The
result of a load operation is then simply the value of the most recent (in memory
order) store to the same location.
On the other hand, a TSO execution is then one for which there exists a
memory order satisfying the following constraints:
1. ∀la, lb : la <p lb ⇒ la <m lb
2. ∀l, s : l <p s⇒ l <m s
3. ∀sa, sb : sa <p sb ⇒ sa <m sb
4. val(la) = val(max
<m
{sa | sa <m la∨sa <p la}). If there is no such a sa, val(la)
is the initial value of the corresponding memory location.
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The first three rules specify that the memory order has to be compatible with
the program order, except that a store can globally be postponed after a load
that is executed within the same process later than the store, this is known as
the store→ load order relaxation. The last rule specifies that the value retrieved
by a load is the one of the most recent store in memory order that precedes the
load in memory order or in program order, the latter ensuring that a process
can see the last value it has stored. If there is no such store, the initial value of
that memory location is loaded.
For the example of Table 1, a possible memory order is given in Table 2. The
first process starts its execution by its store operation, which is not directly added
to the memory order. The following load operations are directly added to the
memory order, and the first process finishes its execution without being blocked.
Then, the second process starts its execution with its store operation, which is
not directly added to the memory order. The following load operations are then
executed and added to the memory order. Finally, the stores of both processes
are eventually transferred to main memory and introduced in the memory order.
Table 2. Possible operation sequence and memory order
Operation sequence Associated memory orderings
store(p1, x, 1) (s1) -
load(p1, x, 1) (l1) l1
load(p1, y, 0) (l2) l1 <m l2
store(p2, y, 1) (s2) l1 <m l2
load(p2, y, 1) (l3) l1 <m l2 <m l3
load(p2, x, 0) (l4) l1 <m l2 <m l3 <m l4
- l1 <m l2 <m l3 <m l4 <m s1
- l1 <m l2 <m l3 <m l4 <m s1 <m s2
The characterization of TSO we have just given is useful in dealing with TSO
axiomatically, but not adapted for applying state-space exploration verification
techniques. Fortunately, there exists a natural equivalent operational description
of TSO, as well as of x86-TSO. In this description (see Fig. 1), stores from
each process are buffered and eventually transferred to shared memory in an
interleaved way. A store only takes effect globally when it is transferred (or
committed) to shared memory, which is also when it is introduced into the
memory order. Committing to shared memory is an internal operation, which is
assumed to be executed nondeterministically. When a process executes a load,
it will read the most recent value in its own store buffer or, if there is no such
buffered store, the value found in shared memory.
In x86-TSO, a global lock is added to enable the processes to gain exclusive
access to the shared memory. While this global lock is held by a given process,
no other process can obtain the lock or execute a load operation, and the only
commit operations that can be executed are those of the process holding the lock.
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An unlock operation is only possible if the process executing it holds the lock and
if the store buffer of that process is empty. Additionally, a new operation called
mfence is added to the set of operations. An mfence operation simply blocks the












Fig. 1. Operational definition of x86-TSO of [5]
The formal operational model of x86-TSO is obtained by extending the pro-
gram as follows. A set
B = {bp1 , . . . , bpn}
of store buffers are introduced, one for each process1. One also adds a global lock
L whose value can be a process p, or undefined (⊥). A global state is thus the
composition of the content of the memory, the value of the global lock, and, for
each process p, a control location and the content of its store buffer [bp], which
is a word in (M,D)∗.
The precise semantics of the operations can then be described as follows.
store operation : store(p,m, v):
[bp]← [bp](m, v).
load operation : load(p,m, v):
If ([L] 6=⊥ and [L] 6= p), then load(p,m, v) cannot be executed;
1 Note that we introduce a buffer per process rather than by processor. This approach
is safe for verification since it allows more behaviors than a model in which some
processes (could) share the same buffer. Furthermore, it is impossible to know which
process will run on which processor when analyzing a program.
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otherwise, let [bp] = (m1, v1)(m2, v2) . . . (mf , vf ) and let i = max{j ∈
{1 . . . f} | mj = m}. If i exists, then the result of the load is the test di = d.
If not, it is the result of the test [m] = v, where [m] denotes the content of
the memory location m.
mfence operation : mfence(p):
If ([bp] = ε) then mfence(p) is enabled;
otherwise mfence(p) cannot be executed.
lock operation : lock(p):
If ([L] =⊥ or [L] = p) then lock(p) is enabled;
otherwise, lock(p) cannot be executed.
unlock operation : unlock(p):
If ([L] = p ∧ [bp] = ε) then [L]←⊥ (the lock is released);
otherwise unlock(p) cannot be executed.
commit operation : commit(p):
If ([L] 6=⊥ and [L] 6= p), then commit(p) cannot be executed;
otherwise, let [bp] = (m1, v1)(m2, v2) . . . (mf , vf ). Then, if [bp] 6= ε, the result
of the commit operation is
[bp]← (m2, v2) . . . (mf , vf )
and
[m1]← v1, or
if [bp] = ε, the commit operation has no effect.
Note that commit(p) is not an operation that can appear in a program, but
is assumed to be always enabled and nondeterministically interleaved with the
actual program operations. Thus, when an mfence(p) or unlock(p) operation
is blocked because the process buffer is nonempty, the implicit execution of
commit(p) operations makes it possible to empty the buffer and enable this
operation.
3 Representing Sets of Buffer Contents and State Space
Exploration
Verifying a program under the x86-TSO memory model can be done with a tool
such as SPIN. However, this leads to two problems. First, one must bound the
size of the buffers in order to keep the model finite-state. Second, the size of the
state space quickly explodes as the size of the buffers grows.
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These problems were addressed in [6] as follows. To start with, rather than
limiting buffers to a fixed size, finite automata are used to represent possibly
infinite sets of buffer contents. This allows unbounded buffer contents to be
taken into account and, with the help of acceleration techniques similar to those
of [17] and [7], to explore the full state space of programs, even if they include
memory accesses (especially memory writes) in cycles that can be indefinitely
repeated.
This approach, with the help of partial-order techniques, was also quite help-
ful in coping with the problem of the size of the state space. Indeed, the automata
representing buffer contents stay reasonably small, since their size is only of the
order of the one of the program for the process writing to the buffer. Furthermore,
buffering memory write operations introduces a lot of independence between the
actions of the various processes, which makes the use of partial-order reduction
techniques especially effective. This was exploited in [6] by using sleep-sets, as
well as other optimization such as only executing commit operations just be-
fore operations with which they are dependent, namely load, mfence and unlock
operations.
The version of the tool used for this paper goes further and fully implements
the persistent-sets reduction of [8, 18]. Persistent sets are formally defined as
follows.
Definition 1. A set T of transitions enabled in a state s is persistent in s iff,
for all nonempty sequences of transitions
s = s1
t1→ s2 t2→ . . . tn−1→ sn tn→ sn+1
from s in the transition system and including only transitions ti /∈ T, 1 ≤ i ≤
n, tn is independent in sn with all transitions in T.
Our implementation uses a simple greedy algorithm for computing persistent
sets and handles the ignoring problem2 described in [19, 8], by using a proviso
condition as suggested in these references. The proviso condition we use imposes
that, if none of the transitions to be explored from a state leads to a state that
is not on the current search stack, then all transitions from that state must be
explored. However, this only guarantees the reachability of local states, some
global states potentially being left unexplored. Thus, to force the detection of
global error states, we consider as dependent with transitions of other processes
all transitions leaving a local state that is part of an error state.
The procedure to compute a persistent set satisfying the proviso condition
is the following. One searches for a process whose enabled operations are only
store or local operations and satisfy the proviso condition, i.e. contain at least
one operation leading to a state that is not on the search stack. If furthermore
the local state of this process is not part of a global error state, the persistent
set is taken to be the set of enabled transitions of this process. Indeed, this set
2 A partial-order search might ”ignore” a process and thus leave it totally inactive at
some point.
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will be independent with all operations of the other processes, as well as with
respect to all possible commit operations. If such a process cannot be found,
the persistent set is taken to be the whole set of enabled transitions (including
commits).
4 From SC to TSO
We turn to the problem of preserving the correctness of a program when it
is moved from an SC to an x86-TSO memory environment. By correctness,
we mean preserving state (un)reachability properties. Note that this captures
safety properties, since safety can always be reduced to state (un)reachability in
an extended model.
An obvious way to make sure a program can safely be moved from SC to
x86-TS0 is to force writes to be immediately committed to main memory by
inserting an mfence after each store, thus precluding any process from moving
with a nonempty store buffer. The obvious drawback of doing so is that any
performance advantage linked to the use of store buffers in the implementation
is lost.
However, this is more than is necessary to guarantee that the executions
that can be seen under x86-TSO are also possible under SC. Recall that the
difference between the axiomatic definition of SC and of TSO is the absence of
the following store-load constraint in TSO:
∀l, s : s <p l⇒ s <m l (1)
Thus stores can be postponed in memory order, which leads to executions that
are not possible in SC. To avoid this it is sufficient to make sure that no process
can execute a load after a store without going through an mfence. Indeed, even
though successive stores might be buffered, they will be committed to main
memory before any later load and hence the constraint (1) will be satisfied by
the memory order, just as in SC. The memory order then becomes an interleaving
of the program orders and the execution semantics thus match SC. We formalize
this in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given an x86-TSO execution, if in the program order of each pro-
cess, an mfence is executed between each load and any preceding store, the mem-
ory order satisfies all the SC constraints.
Proof. The semantics of mfence operations can be formalized by introducing
these operations in the memory order with the following constraints, s, l and m
representing store, load, and mfence operations respectively:
1. ∀s,m : s <p m⇒ s <m m
2. ∀s,m : m <p s⇒ m <m s
3. ∀l,m : l <p m⇒ l <m m
4. ∀l,m : m <p l⇒ m <m l
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In the conditions of the lemma, we have that if s <p l, there is an mfence m such
that s <p m and m <p l. And thus we have that s <m l, using the semantics of
memory fences.
The memory order thus satisfied all constraints of an SC order.
Remark 1. Using Lemma 1, one can deduce that for any algorithm that writes to
memory exclusively with processor instructions that include an implicit memory
barrier (such as CAS (compare-and-swap) or TAS (test-and-set)), moving this
algorithm from an SC to a TSO architecture will preserve its correctness.
The Michael-Scott non-blocking queue [20] is such an algorithm, in which all
store operation to shared memory are implemented by CAS operations, and thus
will run correctly under x86-TSO. This is consistent with the results in [21].
We now have a sufficient condition for guaranteeing correctness while moving
from SC to x86-TSO. The condition is expressed on executions, but can easily
be mapped to a condition on programs: in the control graph of the program,
an mfence must be inserted on all paths leading from a store to a load. This is
sufficient, but can insert many unnecessary mfence instructions. We now turn
to an approach that aims at only inserting the mfence instructions that are
needed to correct errors that have actually appeared when moving the program
to x86-TSO.
5 An iterative mfence insertion algorithm
Our method is quite simple:
– The explicit state verification algorithm, presented in [6] and extended with
the persistent-set partial-order reduction, is run until a state violating a
correctness criterion is found;
– A search for a place in which to insert an mfence in order to make the
undesirable state unreachable is performed and the mfence instruction is
added to the program;
– The procedure is repeated until no further undesirable state can be reached.
The central algorithm is Algorithm 2. It is the algorithm used in [6] with
a call to the function insertMfence() being executed when an incorrect state is
reached. When this happens the function DFS() returns false, which is passed
back up the recursive call chain. Otherwise, DFS() returns true.
The main program is presented in Algorithm 1. It simply initializes the search
and repeats it until DFS() returns true.
We now describe the method used in the insertMfence() procedure. Since we
started with an algorithm that is correct under SC, an undesirable state can only
be reached because of the relaxed memory model. Comparing x86-TSO and SC,
and using the same line of reasoning as that leading to Lemma 1, this can only
happen if a load is performed when the corresponding buffer is nonempty.
Thus, the procedure insertMfence() starts from the detected error state and
searches backwards through the current search path for such a situation. We
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3: init(H) /* Table of visited states */
4: s0 = initial state
5: s0.Sleep = ø
6: delay(s0) = ø
7: push s0 onto Stack
8: until (DFS())
could directly insert an mfence just before the offending load in the code of the
process executing it, but this would be suboptimal if the previous instruction was
a load and not a store given that only store to load transitions are problematic.
The backwards search is thus continued until a store executed by the same
process as the offending load is found. When this operation is detected, we
insert an mfence operation right after it in the control graph of the process.
Note that we just insert one mfence at each run of the verification proce-
dure. This means that the procedure will usually be run repeatedly, but since
the number of possible mfence insertions is bounded by the program size, the
iterative process will always terminate. Moreover, as we only insert necessary
mfence operations, the number of fence instructions inserted is in this sense op-
timal, but the optimal is local: there is no proof that we always reach a globally
minimal number of mfence insertions.
6 Experimental Results
The memory fence insertion technique presented in this paper has been imple-
mented within the prototype tool described in [6]. The input language for this
tool is a simplified version of Promela. It is implemented in Java and uses the
BRICS automata-package [22] for handling the automata representing buffer
contents.
This prototype has been tested on examples, most of which are mutual ex-
clusion algorithms: Dekker’s and Peterson’s algorithm for mutual exclusion, and
Lamport’s Bakery algorithm. We also considered all the litmus tests proposed in
[5] together with the definition of x86-TSO. These litmus tests are sample pro-
grams provided by processor vendors for illustrating possible behaviors of the
memory system. Our tool was used in several ways on these litmus tests. First,
it was checked that the possibility/impossibility scenarios given for the litmus
tests fell respectively within/outside the behaviors considered possible by our
tool. The second was to consider non SC behaviors allowed by the litmus tests
to be errors and to use the approach of this paper to insert memory fences in
order to eliminate these behaviors. All this was performed successfully.
For mutual exclusion, both a single entry version and a repeated entry ver-
sion were considered for Dekker’s and Peterson’s algorithms. In the single entry
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Algorithm 2 Recursive DFS() procedure with error detection and mfence in-
sertion
1: s = top(Stack)
2:
3: /* if s is an error state: */
4: /* search for the last relaxation in the current search path */
5: /* and insert a mfence to avoid this relaxation, and return false */





11: /* Go through stack from top to bottom, looking for cycles */
12: for all ss in (Stack \ top(Stack)) do
13: if (cycleCondition(ss,s)) then









21: T = {t | t ∈ iSleep ∩ t /∈ s.Sleep}
22: s.Sleep = s.Sleep ∩ iSleep
23: if (s ∈ H) then
24: H(s).Sleep = s.Sleep
25: else
26: enter s in H
27: end if
28: else
29: enter s in H
30: T = Persistent Set satisfying Proviso(s)\s.Sleep
31: end if
32:
33: for all t ∈ T do
34: ssucc = succ(s,t)
35: ssucc.Sleep = {tt | tt ∈ s.Sleep ∧ (t, tt) independant in s}
36: push ssucc onto Stack
37:
38: /* if an error is encountered, return false */
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version, each process only attempts to enter the critical section once, whereas
in the repeated entry version, each process repeatedly attempts to enter the
critical section. A single entry version of the generalized Peterson’s algorithm
with 3 processes was also analyzed, as well as Lamport’s Bakery with 2 pro-
cesses. Also notice that the loop executed in that protocol was unrolled, which
explains why 6 locations for memory fence insertion are found, rather than the
3 required. Given this, the number of mfence operations operations inserted by
our algorithm is, for all the examples we have handled, optimal.
For Lamport’s Bakery algorithm, the counter used pushes the repeated entry
version beyond the scope of our tool.
The results with and without error correction are given in Table 3. Column
2 defines the entry version (single or repeated), Column 3 gives the number of
processes. Columns 4 and 5 give information (number of states and time respec-
tively) about the state-space exploration when no fences are inserted. Columns
6 to 9 give information about the exploration with error correction. Column 7
gives the number of iterations needed to insert enough memory fences to correct
the program (and do a last check of its correctness) and Column 6 gives the num-
ber of states in the final program. The 8th Column gives the number of memory
fences inserted, and the last Column gives the total amount of time needed to
insert iteratively the fences and to finally verify that the safety property holds
again. Very interestingly, even though it involves several iterations, this time is,
in almost every case, lower than the time needed to explore the full state space
of the uncorrected version.
For Dekker’s algorithm, it is important to work with the repeated entry
version, since with the single entry version, only 2 memory fences need to be
inserted, whereas 4 are essential for the repeated entry version. Note that in
[21], only 2 memory fences for Dekker under TSO are detected. This appears to
be the linked to the fact that they are using the version of Dekker’s algorithm
given in appendix J of [4], where it is classified as not deadlock-free. The version
we consider is deadlock-free and guarantees freedom of non-progress cycles.
Table 3. Experimental results for Dekker’s and Peterson’s Algorithm for mutual ex-
clusion and for Lamport’s Bakery with and without memory fence insertion
without err. corr. with err. corr.
Program entry-vers #Proc #St t #St #it #f t
Dekker single 2 118 0.84s 92 3 2 0.80s
Dekker repeated 2 5468 12.70s 213 5 4 0.41s
Peterson single 2 108 0.09s 52 3 2 0.03s
Peterson repeated 2 400 0.58s 54 3 2 0.05s
Gen. Peterson single 3 15476 44.42s 1164 7 6 1.55s
Lamport’s Bakery single 2 775 0.58s 340 5 4 0.15s
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All experimental results were obtained by running our Java-program on a
2.0GHz Intel Core Duo laptop running Ubuntu Linux.
Interestingly, compared to results that can be obtained for the SC memory
model, our results show that the exploration of a state space considering the TSO
memory model can be performed with a limited increase in the number of states
to be explored. Table 4 compares the size of the state-space computed by SPIN
(with partial-order reduction) for the SC memory model to the size of the state
space computed by our prototype for the x86-TSO memory model, both when
the full state-space is explored and when error correction is applied. It might
seem surprising that in the latter case, the number of stored states is sometimes
smaller than when doing verification under SC. However, this is due to the
combination of the partial-order techniques and of the additional independence
between the actions of the various processes that comes from delaying stores
until they are needed for a load, an mfence or an unlock operation.




Program entry-vers #Proc #St stored #St visited #St stored #St visited
Dekker single 2 105 165 118 160
Dekker repeated 2 179 214 5468 11322
Peterson single 2 22 47 108 134
Peterson repeated 2 24 49 400 640
Gen. Peterson single 3 1901 4315 15476 46302
Lamport’s Bakery single 2 238 414 775 1186
SPIN-SC Our Prototype-TSO
with err. corrected
Program entry-vers #Proc #St stored #St visited #St stored #St visited
Dekker single 2 105 165 92 117
Dekker repeated 2 179 214 213 365
Peterson single 2 22 47 52 68
Peterson repeated 2 24 49 54 89
Gen. Peterson single 3 1901 4315 1164 2697
Lamport’s Bakery single 2 238 414 340 407
Finally, it is worth noting that only one mfence is inserted at each iteration,
whereas more could be inserted by matching similar code in the various processes.
This could lead to a further reduction of the number of required iterations.
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7 Conclusions and comparison with other work
Besides our work, several fence insertion algorithms have been proposed. The
main originality of our approach is that it is based on a tool that can analyze
cyclic programs under x86-TSO and thus that it can infer fence insertion in this
context.
In [21] a fence insertion algorithm described as “maximal permissive”, i.e.
producing an algorithm with the least possible set of restrictions on its behaviors,
is proposed. The approach is based on bounded model-checking. It works by
propagating through the state graph constraints that represent relaxations that
could be removed by an mfence. Once an undesirable state is reached, one can
use the associated constraints in order to determine how to make that state
unreachable. This approach cannot be applied to cyclic programs and it is not
compatible with partial-order reductions, which does not make it possible to
transfer it to our context.
Another automatic fence insertion algorithm, using bounded model-checking
is given in [23]. This approach is targeted to programs written in C#, whose
memory model is more relaxed than SC, and hence can lead to surprises when
programs are ported to a non SC environment. They use the maxflow-mincut
algorithm [24] to decide where to insert memory fences in oder to ensure that
error states are not reached. No claim is made about the minimality of the set
of inserted fences. Along related lines, [25, 26] considers the Java language and
aims at preserving its semantics when the program is run under a memory model
that is more relaxed then the one specified in the Java model.
A less automatic approach was presented in [11], in which the tool could find
errors, print the corresponding traces, but leave it to the programmer to decide
where to insert memory fences. This approach can only handle finite exploration
graphs.
Less directly related work on guaranteeing correct execution under TSO in-
cludes [27], which shows that under special conditions, such as the triangular
race freedom introduced in [28], all behaviors possible in TSO are also possible
in SC. However, we are not aware of any automated tool to detect triangular
races and achieve freedom of these races. Furthermore, even if a program in-
cludes a triangular race this does not imply that it will have incorrect behaviors,
with respect to a safety property, under a relaxed memory model.
As conclusions, we first claim that we have shown that with the right combi-
nation of techniques (automata for representing buffer contents and partial-order
reductions), using explicit state enumeration to verify programs under relaxed
memory models can be done with limited penalty compared to verification un-
der SC. Retrospectively, this is not really surprising since using store buffers
introduces a lot of independence, which is tamed by the partial-order methods.
Our second claim is that we have shown that this can be effectively exploited in
order to find which memory synchronization operations need to be introduced
to guarantee that correctness is preserved when moving a program from SC to
x86-TSO.
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